A simpler construction of CCA2-secure public-key encryption under general assumptions

  • Authors:
  • Yehuda Lindell

  • Affiliations:
  • IBM T.J. Watson, Hawthorne, New York

  • Venue:
  • EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

In this paper we present a simpler construction of a publickey encryption scheme that achieves adaptive chosen ciphertext security (CCA2), assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations. We build on previous works of Sahai and De Santis et al. and construct a scheme that we believe is the easiest to understand to date. In particular, it is only slightly more involved than the Naor-Yung encryption scheme that is secure against passive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA1). We stress that the focus of this paper is on simplicity only.