Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
The random oracle methodology, revisited (preliminary version)
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SAC '01 Revised Papers from the 8th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
SKEME: a versatile secure key exchange mechanism for Internet
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Scalable, Server-Passive, User-Anonymous Timed Release Cryptography
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
New approaches for deniable authentication
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Provably Secure Timed-Release Public Key Encryption
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Deniable Authentication on the Internet
Information Security and Cryptology
An Efficient Deniable Key Exchange Protocol (Extended Abstract)
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
New Approaches for Deniable Authentication
Journal of Cryptology
Conditional oblivious transfer and timed-release encryption
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Timed release of standard digital signatures
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
A simpler construction of CCA2-secure public-key encryption under general assumptions
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Deniable internet key exchange
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Errors in computational complexity proofs for protocols
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Efficient and non-interactive timed-release encryption
ICICS'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Timed-release and key-insulated public key encryption
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
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We propose a new notion of timed encryption, in which the security holds within time t while it is totally insecure after some time T t . We are interested in the case where t and T are both polynomial and propose two schemes (with and without random oracles). We apply this primitive to construct a new deniable key exchange that allows two parties to securely agree on a secret while either of them can deny the fact of communication and hence avoid an undesirable trace from it. Our protocol is adaptively deniable and secrecy in the concurrent and non-eraser model that allows session state reveal attacks and eavesdropping attacks. Here a session state reveal attack in the non-eraser model means that a user can not erase his intermediate data (e.g., due to the system backup or recovery) and, when compromised, will give it to the attacker. An eavesdropping attack, one of the major concerns in deniability, allows an adversary to eavesdrop transcripts between honest users which he does not know the randomness inside. Our protocol does not assume random oracles (if the underlying timed encryption does not do so). The only price we pay is a timing restriction. However, this restriction is rather weak and it essentially asks a user to answer a message as soon as possible and can be satisfied by almost all online protocols.