Distributed games: from mechanisms to protocols
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Genetic Programming Theory and Practice (Genetic Programming)
Genetic Programming Theory and Practice (Genetic Programming)
Experiences applying game theory to system design
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
Influences on cooperation in BitTorrent communities
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
On honesty in sovereign information sharing
EDBT'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Advances in Database Technology
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The growing number of distributed information systems such as the internet has created a need for security in data sharing. When several autonomous parties attempt to share data, there is not necessarily any guarantee that the participants will share data truthfully. In fact, there is often a large incentive to engage in behavior that can sabotage the effectiveness of such a system. We analyze these situations in light of game theory, a mathematical model which permits us to consider behavior and choices for any autonomous party. This paper uses this theory to create a behavior enforcement method that does not need a central management system. We use a simple punishment method that is inherently available in most scenarios. Our approach is applicable to a variety of assured information sharing applications where the members of a coalition have to work together to solve a problem.