Communications of the ACM
Security: for ubiquitous computing
Security: for ubiquitous computing
A Privacy Awareness System for Ubiquitous Computing Environments
UbiComp '02 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Ubiquitous Computing
The blocker tag: selective blocking of RFID tags for consumer privacy
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Privacy in e-commerce: stated preferences vs. actual behavior
Communications of the ACM - Transforming China
Disabling RFID tags with visible confirmation: clipped tags are silenced
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Making Radio Frequency Identification Visible--A Watchdog Tag
PERCOMW '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Scanning with a purpose: supporting the fair information principles in RFID protocols
UCS'04 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Ubiquitous Computing Systems
An empirical investigation of concerns of everyday tracking and recording technologies
UbiComp '08 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Ubiquitous computing
AmI '08 Proceedings of the European Conference on Ambient Intelligence
From technology prototypes to ethnographic studies: a look to the Ubicomp research directions
Mobility '08 Proceedings of the International Conference on Mobile Technology, Applications, and Systems
The Acceptance of Domestic Ambient Intelligence Appliances by Prospective Users
Pervasive '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Pervasive Computing
Information privacy in institutional and end-user tracking and recording technologies
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing
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This article investigates the conflicting area of user benefits arising through item level RFID tagging and a desire for privacy. It distinguishes between three approaches feasible to address consumer privacy concerns. One is to kill RFID tags at store exits. The second is to lock tags and have user unlock them if they want to initiate reader communication (user scheme). The third is to let the network access users' RFID tags while adhering to a privacy protocol (agent scheme). The perception and reactions of future users to these three privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) are compared in the present article and an attempt is made to understand the reasoning behind their preferences. The main conclusion is that users don't trust complex PETs as they are envisioned today. Instead they prefer to kill RFID chips at store exits even if they appreciate after sales services. Enhancing trust through security and privacy 'visibility' as well as PET simplicity may be the road to take for PET engineers in UbiComp.