Tussle in cyberspace: defining tomorrow's internet
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Why Information Security is Hard-An Economic Perspective
ACSAC '01 Proceedings of the 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
The Economic Incentives for Sharing Security Information
Information Systems Research
How to lease the internet in your spare time
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of information security games
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Nudge: intermediaries' role in interdependent network security
TRUST'10 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Trust and trustworthy computing
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By employing an interdependent security game-theoretic framework, we study how individual Internet Service Providers can coordinate the investment decisions of end users to improve the security of the overall system. We study two different forms of intervention: rebates in combination with penalties (pay for outcome) and costsubsidies (pay for effort).