Tussle in cyberspace: defining tomorrow's internet
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Why Information Security is Hard-An Economic Perspective
ACSAC '01 Proceedings of the 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making
IEEE Security and Privacy
The Economic Incentives for Sharing Security Information
Information Systems Research
How to lease the internet in your spare time
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Implementing and testing a virus throttle
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of information security games
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Security and insurance management in networks with heterogeneous agents
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Why IT managers don't go for cyber-insurance products
Communications of the ACM - Scratch Programming for All
Blue versus Red: Towards a Model of Distributed Security Attacks
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Nudging Privacy: The Behavioral Economics of Personal Information
IEEE Security and Privacy
Nudge: intermediaries' role in interdependent network security
Proceedings of the 2010 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
When information improves information security
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Security games with market insurance
GameSec'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
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By employing an interdependent security game-theoretic framework, we study how individual Internet Service Providers can coordinate the investment decisions of end users to improve the security and trustworthiness of the overall system. We discuss two different forms of intervention: rebates in combination with penalties (pay for outcome) and cost-subsidies (pay for effort).