Uncertainty in the weakest-link security game
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Scalable byzantine computation
ACM SIGACT News
Nudge: intermediaries' role in interdependent network security
TRUST'10 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Trust and trustworthy computing
A game-theoretical approach for finding optimal strategies in a botnet defense model
GameSec'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Decision and game theory for security
Uncertainty in interdependent security games
GameSec'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Decision and game theory for security
The security cost of cheap user interaction
Proceedings of the 2011 workshop on New security paradigms workshop
A learning-based approach to reactive security
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Modeling internet security investments: tackling topological information uncertainty
GameSec'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
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We develop a two-sided multiplayer model of security in which attackers aim to deny service and defenders strategize to secure their assets. Attackers benefit from the successful compromise of target systems, however, may suffer penalties for increased attack activities. Defenders weigh the force of an attack against the cost of security. We consider security decision-making in tightly and loosely coupled networks and allow defense expenditures in protection and self-insurance technologies.