Security games with market insurance

Authors:
Benjamin Johnson;Rainer Böhme;Jens Grossklags
Affiliations:
Department of Mathematics, UC, Berkeley;Department of Information Systems, University of Münster, Germany;College of Information Sciences and Technology, Penn State University
Venue:
GameSec'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
Year:
2011

Citing 8
Cited 0

Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of information security games

Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Security and insurance management in networks with heterogeneous agents

Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Spamalytics: an empirical analysis of spam marketing conversion

Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Why IT managers don't go for cyber-insurance products

Communications of the ACM - Scratch Programming for All
Learning more about the underground economy: a case-study of keyloggers and dropzones

ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Nudge: intermediaries' role in interdependent network security

TRUST'10 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Trust and trustworthy computing
Secure or insure: an economic analysis of security interdependencies and investment types

Secure or insure: an economic analysis of security interdependencies and investment types
The underground economy of spam: a botmaster's perspective of coordinating large-scale spam campaigns

LEET'11 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Security games are characterized by multiple players who strategically adjust their defenses against an abstract attacker, represented by realizations of nature. The defense strategies include both actions where security generates positive externalities and actions that do not. When the players are assumed to be risk averse, market insurance enters as a third strategic option. We formulate a one-shot security game with market insurance, characterize its pure equilibria, and describe how the equilibria compare to established results. Simplifying assumptions include homogeneous players, fair insurance premiums, and complete information except for realizations of nature. The results add more realism to the interpretation of analytical models of security games and might inform policy makers on adjusting incentives to improve network security and foster the development of a market for cyber-insurance.