Improved security bounds for pseudorandom permutations
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
XOR MACs: New Methods for Message Authentication Using Finite Pseudorandom Functions
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Performance Analysis and Parallel Implementation of Dedicated Hash Functions
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
On the Security of Randomized CBC-MAC Beyond the Birthday Paradox Limit: A New Construction
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
"Sandwich" is indeed secure: how to authenticate a message with just one hashing
ACISP'07 Proceedings of the 12th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Forgery and partial key-recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using hash collisions
ASIACRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
A failure-friendly design principle for hash functions
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
How to maximize software performance of symmetric primitives on pentium III and 4 processors
FSE'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
On the security of HMAC and NMAC based on HAVAL, MD4, MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1 (extended abstract)
SCN'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
New proofs for NMAC and HMAC: security without collision-resistance
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
On the security of iterated message authentication codes
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Side Channel Analysis of Some Hash Based MACs: A Response to SHA-3 Requirements
ICICS '08 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
A Double-Piped Mode of Operation for MACs, PRFs and PROs: Security beyond the Birthday Barrier
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
PMAC with parity: minimizing the query-length influence
CT-RSA'12 Proceedings of the 12th conference on Topics in Cryptology
Generic related-key attacks for HMAC
ASIACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
HMAC is a popular MAC (Message Authentication Code) that is based on a cryptographic hash function. HMAC is provided with a formal proof of security, in which it is proven to be a PRF (Pseudo-Random Function) under the condition that its underlying compression function is a PRF. Nonetheless, the security of HMAC is limited by a birthday attack, that is, HMAC using a compression function with n- bit output gets forged after about 2n/2 queries. In this paper we resolve this problem by introducing novel construction we call L-Lane HMAC. Our construction is provided with concrete-security reduction accomplishing a security guarantee well beyond the birthday limit. L-Lane HMAC requires more invocations to the compression function than the conventional HMAC, but the performance decline is smaller than those of previous constructs. In addition, L-Lane HMAC inherits the design principles of the original HMAC, such as single-key usage and off-the-shelf hash-function calls.