Forgery and partial key-recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using hash collisions

  • Authors:
  • Scott Contini;Yiqun Lisa Yin

  • Affiliations:
  • Centre for Advanced Computing – ACAC, Macquarie University, Australia;Independent Consultant, Greenwich, CT

  • Venue:
  • ASIACRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the security of HMAC and NMAC, both of which are hash-based message authentication codes. We present distinguishing, forgery, and partial key recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using collisions of MD4, MD5, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. Our results demonstrate that the strength of a cryptographic scheme can be greatly weakened by the insecurity of the underlying hash function.