Security of NMAC and HMAC based on non-malleability

  • Authors:
  • Marc Fischlin

  • Affiliations:
  • Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany

  • Venue:
  • CT-RSA'08 Proceedings of the 2008 The Cryptopgraphers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We give an alternative security proof for NMAC and HMAC when deployed as a message authentication code, supplementing the previous result by Bellare (Crypto 2006). We show that (black-box) nonmalleability and unpredictability of the compression function suffice in this case, yielding security under different assumptions. This also suggests that some sort of non-malleability is a desirable design goal for hash functions.