Distinguishing attack on secret prefix MAC instantiated with reduced SHA-1

  • Authors:
  • Siyuan Qiao;Wei Wang;Keting Jia

  • Affiliations:
  • Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, China;School of Computer Science and Technology, Shandong University, Jinan, China and Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jina ...;Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, China

  • Venue:
  • ICISC'09 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information security and cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a new distinguishing attack which works for secret prefix MAC based on 65-step (12-76) SHA-1. By birthday paradox, we first guarantee the existence of an internal collision at the output of the first iteration, then identify it by choosing the second message block smartly, and finally distinguish the specific MAC from a random function by making use of a near-collision differential path. The complexity of our new distinguisher is 280.9 queries with success probability 0.51. In comparison, we also present a distinguisher on secret prefix MAC instantiated with 63-step (8-70) SHA-1 according to Wang's method introduced at FSE 2009 [21], which needs about 2157 queries with success probability 0.70.