Improved related-key boomerang attacks on round-reduced threefish-512

  • Authors:
  • Jiazhe Chen;Keting Jia

  • Affiliations:
  • Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, China;Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, China

  • Venue:
  • ISPEC'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Hash function Skein is one of the 14 NIST SHA-3 second round candidates. Threefish is a tweakable block cipher as the core of Skein, defined with a 256-, 512-, and 1024-bit block size. The 512-bit block size is the primary proposal of the authors. Skein had been updated after it entered the second round; the only difference between the original and the new version is the rotation constants. In this paper we construct related-key boomerang distinguishers on round-reduced Threefish-512 based on the new rotation constants using the method of modular differential. With these distinguishers, we mount related-key boomerang key recovery attacks on Threefish-512 reduced to 32, 33 and 34 rounds. The attack on 32-round Threefish-512 has time complexity 2195 with memory of 212 bytes. The attacks on Threefish-512 reduced to 33 and 34 rounds have time complexity of 2324.6 and 2474.4 encryptions respectively, and both with negligible memory. The best key recovery attack known before is proposed by Aumasson et al. Their attack, which bases on the old rotation constants, is also a related-key boomerang attack. For 32-round Threefish-512, their attack requires 2312 encryptions and 271 bytes of memory.