Boomerang attacks on hash function using auxiliary differentials

  • Authors:
  • Gaëtan Leurent;Arnab Roy

  • Affiliations:
  • Université du Luxembourg and SnT, Luxembourg;Université du Luxembourg and SnT, Luxembourg

  • Venue:
  • CT-RSA'12 Proceedings of the 12th conference on Topics in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In this paper we study boomerang attacks in the chosen-key setting. This is particularly relevant to hash function analysis, since many boomerang attacks have been described against ARX-based designs. We present a new way to combine message modifications, or auxiliary differentials, with the boomerang attack. We show that under some conditions, we can combine three independent paths instead of two for the classical boomerang attack. Our main result is obtained by applying this technique to round-reduced Skein-256, for which we show a distinguisher on the keyed permutation with complexity only 257, and a distinguisher on the compression function with complexity 2114. We also discuss application of the technique to Skein-512 and show some problems with the paths used in previous boomerang analysis of Skein-512.