Security of a leakage-resilient protocol for key establishment and mutual authentication

Authors:
Raphael C.-W. Phan;Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo;Swee-Huay Heng
Affiliations:
Laboratoire de sécurité et de cryptographie, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland;Canberra, Australia;Centre for Cryptography and Information Security, Faculty of Information Science and Technology, Multimedia University, Malaysia
Venue:
ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
Year:
2007

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Abstract

We revisit Shin et al.'s leakage-resilient password-based authenticated key establishment protocol (LR-AKEP) and the security model used to prove the security of LR-AKEP. By refining the Leak oracle in the security model, we show that LR-AKE (1) can, in fact, achieve a stronger notion of leakage-resilience than initially claimed and (2) also achieve an additional feature of traceability, not previously mentioned.