Universal one-way hash functions and their cryptographic applications
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Communications of the ACM
Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-Based Protocols SecureAgainst Dictionary Attacks
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Security of a leakage-resilient protocol for key establishment and mutual authentication
ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
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At Asiacrypt 2003, Shin et al., have proposed a new authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol named Leakage-Resilient AKE (for short, LR-AKE) [13]. The authenticity of LR-AKE is based on a user's (relatively short) password and his/her stored secrets in both client side and server side. In their LR-AKE protocol, neither PKI (Public Key Infrastructures) nor TRM (Tamper Resistant Modules) is required and leakage of the stored secrets from any side does not reveal any critical information on the password. As main contributions of this paper, we propose a simplified LR-AKE (LR-AKE) protocol that is more efficient rather than [13]: about 100% decrease in computation costs (excluding some negligible costs) in the initialization phase and about 96% reduction in memory size on client's and servers' devices where the memory size is optimal. That makes the LR-AKE protocol applicable for many applications, because password-based AKE protocols have been motivated by the very practical implementations.