Security analysis of MISTY1

Authors:
Hidema Tanaka;Yasuo Hatano;Nobuyuki Sugio;Toshinobu Kaneko
Affiliations:
National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Tokyo, Japan;Systems Development Laboratory, Hitachi, Ltd., Yokohama Laboratory, Yokohama, Kanagawa, Japan;Service & Solution Development Department, NTT DoCoMo, Inc., Yokosuka, Kanagawa, Japan;Tokyo University of Science, Noda, Japan
Venue:
WISA'07 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information security applications
Year:
2007

Citing 4
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Higher Order Differential Attacks on Reduced-Round MISTY1

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Abstract

We analyze 64-bit block cipher MISTY1 from several standpoints. Our analysis consists of two algorithms based on the higher order differential property of the S-box. The first succeeds in attacking a six round MISTY1 provided 218.9 chosen plaintexts and 280.9 computational cost. The second succeeds in attacking a seven round MISTY1 with no FL functions by controlling the value of the fixed part of the plaintext and using a 2-round elimination method provided 211.9 chosen plaintexts and 2125.1 computational cost. Both algorithms exceeds the existing attack algorithms against MISTY1 and give new perspectives for the security of MISTY1.