Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
On MISTY1 Higher Order Differential Cryptanalysis
ICISC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round MISTY
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
New Block Encryption Algorithm MISTY
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Higher Order Differential Attak of CAST Cipher
FSE '98 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Improved Cryptanalysis of MISTY1
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
The Saturation Attack - A Bait for Twofish
FSE '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Weak-Key Classes of 7-Round MISTY 1 and 2 for Related-Key Amplified Boomerang Attacks
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
WISA'07 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information security applications
Weak-Key class of MISTY1 for related-key differential attack
Inscrypt'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Weak keys of the full MISTY1 block cipher for related-key differential cryptanalysis
CT-RSA'13 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Topics in Cryptology
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MISTY1 is a 64-bit block cipher that has provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. MISTY1 is one of the algorithms selected in the European NESSIE project, and it has been recommended for Japanese e-Government ciphers by the CRYPTREC project. This paper shows that higher order differential attacks can be successful against 6-round and 7-round versions of MISTY1 with FL functions. The attack on 6-round MISTY1 can recover a partial subkey with a data complexity of 253.7 and a computational complexity of 253.7, which is the smallest computational complexity for an attack on 6-round MISTY1. The attack on 7-round MISTY1 can recover a partial subkey with a data complexity of 254.1 and a computational complexity of 2120.7, which signifies the first successful attack on 7-round MISTY1 without limiting conditions such as a weak key.