Differential cryptanalysis of the data encryption standard
Differential cryptanalysis of the data encryption standard
Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Strenght of MISTY1 without FL Function for Higher Order Differential Attack
AAECC-13 Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
New Block Encryption Algorithm MISTY
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Improved Cryptanalysis of MISTY1
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
An Improved Impossible Differential Attack on MISTY1
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Higher Order Differential Attacks on Reduced-Round MISTY1
Information Security and Cryptology --- ICISC 2008
A related-key rectangle attack on the full KASUMI
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
On related-key attacks and KASUMI: the case of a5/3
INDOCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptology in India
Weak-Key class of MISTY1 for related-key differential attack
Inscrypt'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Weak keys of the full MISTY1 block cipher for related-key differential cryptanalysis
CT-RSA'13 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Topics in Cryptology
On computational complexity of impossible differential cryptanalysis
Information Processing Letters
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The block ciphers MISTY1 and MISTY2 proposed by Matsui are based on the principle of provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. This paper presents attacks on reduced-round variants of both ciphers, without as well as with the key-dependent linear functions FL. The attacks employ collision-searching techniques and impossible differentials. KASUMI, a MISTY variant to be used in next generation cellular phones, can be attacked with the latter method faster than brute force when reduced to six sounds.