Differential cryptanalysis of the data encryption standard
Differential cryptanalysis of the data encryption standard
Strenght of MISTY1 without FL Function for Higher Order Differential Attack
AAECC-13 Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes
On MISTY1 Higher Order Differential Cryptanalysis
ICISC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round MISTY
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
New Block Encryption Algorithm MISTY
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Miss in the Middle Attacks on IDEA and Khufu
FSE '99 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Improved Cryptanalysis of MISTY1
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Cryptanalysis of Skipjack reduced to 31 rounds using impossible differentials
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Improving the efficiency of impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced Camellia and MISTY1
CT-RSA'08 Proceedings of the 2008 The Cryptopgraphers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in cryptology
Impossible Boomerang Attack for Block Cipher Structures
IWSEC '09 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Security: Advances in Information and Computer Security
A practical-time related-key attack on the KASUMI cryptosystem used in GSM and 3G telephony
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Impossible differential cryptanalysis on feistel ciphers with SP and SPS round functions
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
The (related-key) impossible boomerang attack and its application to the AES block cipher
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Security analysis of the GF-NLFSR structure and four-cell block cipher
ICICS'09 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Impossible differential attacks on reduced-round LBlock
ISPEC'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
Improved results on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round Camellia-192/256
Journal of Systems and Software
Fundamenta Informaticae - Cryptology in Progress: 10th Central European Conference on Cryptology, Będlewo Poland, 2010
Zero correlation linear cryptanalysis with reduced data complexity
FSE'12 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
Weak-Key class of MISTY1 for related-key differential attack
Inscrypt'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Impossible differential cryptanalysis on tweaked E2
NSS'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Network and System Security
Weak keys of the full MISTY1 block cipher for related-key differential cryptanalysis
CT-RSA'13 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Topics in Cryptology
On computational complexity of impossible differential cryptanalysis
Information Processing Letters
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MISTY1 is a Feistel block cipher that received a great deal of cryptographic attention. Its recursive structure, as well as the added FL layers, have been successful in thwarting various cryptanalytic techniques. The best known attacks on reduced variants of the cipher are on either a 4-round variant with the FL functions, or a 6-round variant without the FL functions (out of the 8 rounds of the cipher). In this paper we combine the generic impossible differential attack against 5-round Feistel ciphers with the dedicated Slicing attack to mount an attack on 5-round MISTY1 with all the FL functions with time complexity of 246.45 simple operations. We then extend the attack to 6-round MISTY1 with the FL functions present, leading to the best known cryptanalytic result on the cipher. We also present an attack on 7-round MISTY1 without the FL layers.