Impossible differential attacks on reduced-round LBlock

  • Authors:
  • Ya Liu;Dawu Gu;Zhiqiang Liu;Wei Li

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China;School of Computer Science and Technology, Donghua University, Shanghai, China and Shanghai Key Laboratory of Integrate Administration Technologies for Information Security, Shanghai, China

  • Venue:
  • ISPEC'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

LBlock is a lightweight block cipher with 32 rounds, which can be implemented efficiently not only in hardware environment but also in software platforms. In this paper, by exploiting the structure of LBlock and the redundancy in its key schedule, we propose an impossible differential attack on 21-round LBlock based on a 14-round impossible differential. The data and time complexities are about 262.5 chosen plaintexts and 273.7 21-round encryptions, respectively. As far as we know, these results are the currently best results on LBlock in the single key scenario.