New impossible differential attacks of reduced-round Camellia-192 and Camellia-256

  • Authors:
  • Jiazhe Chen;Keting Jia;Hongbo Yu;Xiaoyun Wang

  • Affiliations:
  • Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, China and School of Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan, China;Institute for Advanced Study, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, China and School of Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan, China and Institu ...

  • Venue:
  • ACISP'11 Proceedings of the 16th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Camellia, which is a block cipher selected as a standard by ISO/IEC, is one of the most widely used block ciphers. In this paper, we propose several 6-round impossible differentials of Camellia with FL/FL-1 layers in the middle of them. With the impossible differentials and a well-organized precomputed table, impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256 are given, and the time complexities are 2175.3 and 2206.8 respectively. In addition, an impossible differential attack on 15-round Camellia-256 without FL/FL-1 layers and whitening is also be given, which needs about 2236.1 encryptions. To the best of our knowledge, these are the best cryptanalytic results of Camellia-192/-256 with FL/FL-1 layers and Camellia-256 without FL/FL-1 layers to date.