New impossible differential attacks on camellia

  • Authors:
  • Dongxia Bai;Leibo Li

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, China and School of Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan, China

  • Venue:
  • ISPEC'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Camellia is one of the most worldwide used block ciphers, which has been selected as a standard by ISO/IEC. In this paper, we propose several new 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia with 2 FL/FL−1 layers, which turn out to be the first 7-round impossible differentials with 2 FL/FL−1 layers. Combined with some basic techniques including the early abort approach and the key schedule consideration, we achieve the impossible differential attacks on 11-round Camellia-128, 11-round Camellia-192, 12-round Camellia-192, and 14-round Camellia-256, and the time complexity are 2123.8, 2121.7, 2171.4 and 2238.3 respectively. As far as we know, these are the best results against the reduced-round variants of Camellia. Especially, we give the first attack on 11-round Camellia-128 reduced version with FL/FL−1 layers.