The Design of Rijndael
Camellia: A 128-Bit Block Cipher Suitable for Multiple Platforms - Design and Analysis
SAC '00 Proceedings of the 7th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round MISTY
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round ARIA and Camellia
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
New Impossible Differential Attacks on AES
INDOCRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
An Improved Impossible Differential Attack on MISTY1
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
New Results on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced---Round Camellia---128
Selected Areas in Cryptography
Cryptanalysis of Skipjack reduced to 31 rounds using impossible differentials
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
FOX: a new family of block ciphers
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
New impossible differential attacks on camellia
ISPEC'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
New observations on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round camellia
FSE'12 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
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Impossible differential cryptanalysis is one of the conventional methods in the field of cryptanalysis of block ciphers. In this paper, a general model of an impossible differential attack is introduced. Then, according to this model, the concept of an ideal impossible differential attack is defined and it is proven that the time complexity of an ideal attack only depends on the number of involved round key bits in the attack.