On the Security of CAMELLIA against the Square Attack

Authors:
Yongjin Yeom;Sangwoo Park;Iljun Kim
Affiliations:
-;-;-
Venue:
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Year:
2002

Citing 12
Cited 13

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Cryptanalysis of Ladder-DES

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The Block Cipher Square

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New Block Encryption Algorithm MISTY

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Attack on Six Rounds of Crypton

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Improved Cryptanalysis of Rijndael

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Improved SQUARE Attacks against Reduced-Round HIEROCRYPT

FSE '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis of Camellia

ICISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Seoul on Information Security and Cryptology
The Saturation Attack - A Bait for Twofish

FSE '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Square Attack on Reduced Camellia Cipher

ICICS '01 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information and Communications Security

Higher Order Differential Attack of Camellia (II)

SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Survey and benchmark of block ciphers for wireless sensor networks

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Impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round ARIA and Camellia

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CANS '09 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security
Differential fault analysis on Camellia

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Square like attack on camellia

ICICS'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information and communications security
Square attack on reduced-round Zodiac cipher

ISPEC'08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information security practice and experience
Improving the efficiency of impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced Camellia and MISTY1

CT-RSA'08 Proceedings of the 2008 The Cryptopgraphers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in cryptology
Collision attack and pseudorandomness of reduced-round camellia

SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Improved collision attack on reduced round camellia

CANS'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology and Network Security
New observation on camellia

SAC'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Integral cryptanalysis of reduced FOX block cipher

ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
New impossible differential attacks on camellia

ISPEC'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience

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Abstract

Camellia is a 128 bit block cipher proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi. We discuss the security of Camellia against the square attack. We find a 4 round distinguisher and construct a basic square attack. We can attack 5 round Camellia by guessing one byte subkey and using 216 chosen plaintexts. Cosidering the key schdule, we may extend this attack up to 9 round Camellia including the first FL/FL-1 function layer.