Differential fault analysis on Camellia

Authors:
Wei Li;Dawu Gu;Juanru Li;Zhiqiang Liu;Ya Liu
Affiliations:
School of Computer Science and Technology, Donghua University, Shanghai 201620, China and Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China
Venue:
Journal of Systems and Software
Year:
2010

Citing 17
Cited 1

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ICISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Seoul on Information Security and Cryptology
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AES'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Advanced Encryption Standard
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SAC'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography

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INTRUST'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Trusted Systems

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Abstract

Camellia is a 128-bit block cipher published by NTT and Mitsubishi in 2000. On the basis of the byte-oriented model and the differential analysis principle, we propose a differential fault attack on the Camellia algorithm. Mathematical analysis and simulating experiments show that our attack can recover its 128-bit, 192-bit or 256-bit secret key by introducing 30 faulty ciphertexts. Thus our result in this study describes that Camellia is vulnerable to differential fault analysis. This work provides a new reference to the fault analysis of other block ciphers.