Strenght of MISTY1 without FL Function for Higher Order Differential Attack
AAECC-13 Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes
The Interpolation Attack on Block Ciphers
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Higher Order Differential Attak of CAST Cipher
FSE '98 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Improved Cryptanalysis of Rijndael
FSE '00 Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Improved Upper Bounds of Differential and Linear Characteristic Probability for Camellia
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis of Camellia
ICISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Seoul on Information Security and Cryptology
Square Attack on Reduced Camellia Cipher
ICICS '01 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information and Communications Security
On the Security of CAMELLIA against the Square Attack
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Survey and benchmark of block ciphers for wireless sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)
Impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round ARIA and Camellia
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
Differential fault analysis on Camellia
Journal of Systems and Software
Square like attack on camellia
ICICS'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information and communications security
Improving the efficiency of impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced Camellia and MISTY1
CT-RSA'08 Proceedings of the 2008 The Cryptopgraphers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in cryptology
Integral cryptanalysis of ARIA
Inscrypt'09 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
New impossible differential attacks of reduced-round Camellia-192 and Camellia-256
ACISP'11 Proceedings of the 16th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Collision attack and pseudorandomness of reduced-round camellia
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
A fast calculus for the linearizing attack and its application to an attack on KASUMI
AAECC'06 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes
Improved collision attack on reduced round camellia
CANS'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology and Network Security
SAC'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
New impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round camellia
CANS'11 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Cryptology and Network Security
New impossible differential attacks on camellia
ISPEC'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
Improved results on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round Camellia-192/256
Journal of Systems and Software
Low data complexity attack on reduced camellia-256
ACISP'12 Proceedings of the 17th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
Fundamenta Informaticae - Cryptology in Progress: 10th Central European Conference on Cryptology, Będlewo Poland, 2010
New observations on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round camellia
FSE'12 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
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Camellia is a 128-bit block cipher, proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi in 2000. It has been shown that 10 round variant without FL function under a 256-bit secret key is attackable by Higher Order Differential Attack and even if FL function is included, 9 round variant is attackable by Square Attack. In this paper, we present a new attack of Camellia using 16-th order differential and show that 11 round variant without FL function is attackable. Moreover, we show that 11 round variant with FL function is attackable, if we use chosen ciphertexts for this attack.