Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Strenght of MISTY1 without FL Function for Higher Order Differential Attack
AAECC-13 Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes
On MISTY1 Higher Order Differential Cryptanalysis
ICISC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology
On the Strength of KASUMI without FL Functions against Higher Order Differential Attack
ICISC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Higher Order Differential Attack Using Chosen Higher Order Differences
SAC '98 Proceedings of the Selected Areas in Cryptography
Higher Order Differential Attack of Camellia (II)
SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Probabilistic Higher Order Differential Attack and Higher Order Bent Functions
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
New Block Encryption Algorithm MISTY
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
The Interpolation Attack on Block Ciphers
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Higher Order Differential Attak of CAST Cipher
FSE '98 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
A Fast New DES Implementation in Software
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
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This paper describes a linearizing attack with fast calculus for higher order differential attack. The linearizing attack, proposed by Shimoyama et al. [13], [15], linearizes the attack equation and determines the key by Gaussian elimination. The cost of calculating the coefficient matrix is dominant overhead in this attack. We improve the algorithm used to calculate the coefficient matrix by applying a bit-slice type implementation [3]. We apply this method to five-round KASUMI and show that it need 227.5 chosen plaintexts and 234 KASUMI encryptions.