New Structure of Block Ciphers with Provable Security against Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
The Interpolation Attack on Block Ciphers
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Improving the Higher Order Differential Attack and Cryptanalysis of the KN Cipher
ISW '97 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Security
Higher Order Differential Attack of Camellia (II)
SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round MISTY
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Improved Cryptanalysis of MISTY1
FSE '02 Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
An Improved Impossible Differential Attack on MISTY1
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
A fast calculus for the linearizing attack and its application to an attack on KASUMI
AAECC'06 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The encryption algorithm MISTY is a "provably secure" one against Linear and Differential cryptanalysis. Since the designer showed 3 round MISTY1 without FL function is provable secure, we omit FL to estimate the strength for Higher Order Differential Attack. This attack is a chosen plain text attack and uses the value of higher order differential of output to derive an attacking equation for sub-keys. The value depends on the degree of output and the degree depends on the choice of plain texts. We show that the effective chosen plain text and 5 round MISTY1 without FL is attackable using 11 different 7th order differentials. And we show the attacks to remaining sub-keys by the determined sub-keys and intermediate values. Intermediate value is a constant in the process of encryption. As the result, we can determine all sub-key in 5 round MISTY1 without FL.