Differential fault analysis on AES key schedule and some countermeasures

  • Authors:
  • Chien-Ning Chen;Sung-Ming Yen

  • Affiliations:
  • Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security, Dept of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Central University, Chung-Li, Taiwan, R.O.C.;Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security, Dept of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Central University, Chung-Li, Taiwan, R.O.C.

  • Venue:
  • ACISP'03 Proceedings of the 8th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

This paper describes a DFA attack on the AES key schedule. This fault model assumes that the attacker can induce a single byte fault on the round key. It efficiently finds the key of AES-128 with feasible computation and less than thirty pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts. Several countermeasures are also proposed. This weakness can be resolved without modifying the structure of the AES algorithm and without decreasing the efficiency.