Optimal Robust Compression of Test Responses
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
IEEE Transactions on Computers
DSN '04 Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Differential fault analysis on AES key schedule and some countermeasures
ACISP'03 Proceedings of the 8th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
New class of nonlinear systematic error detecting codes
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Error detection and error correction procedures for the advanced encryption standard
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Novel PUF-Based Error Detection Methods in Finite State Machines
Information Security and Cryptology --- ICISC 2008
Non-linear Error Detection for Finite State Machines
Information Security Applications
An emerging threat: eve meets a robot
INTRUST'10 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Trusted Systems
Comprehensive analysis of software countermeasures against fault attacks
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Traditional hardware error detection methods based on linear codes make assumptions about the typical or expected errors and faults and concentrate the detection power towards the expected errors and faults. These traditional methods are not optimal for the protection of hardware implementations of cryptographic hardware against fault attacks. An adversary performing a fault-based attack can be unpredictable and exploit weaknesses in the traditional implementations. To detect these attacks where no assumptions about expected error or fault distributions should be made we propose and motivate an architecture based on robust nonlinear systematic (n,k)-error-detecting codes. These code can provide uniform error detecting coverage independently of the error distributions. They make no assumptions about what faults or errors will be injected by an attacker and have fewer undetectable errors than linear codes with the same (n,k). We also present optimization approaches which provide for a tradeoff between the levels of robustness and required overhead for hardware implementations.