An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Information Processing Letters
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
On the security of public key protocols
SFCS '81 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Analysis of an electronic voting protocol in the applied pi calculus
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
A New Approach for Biometric Template Storage and Remote Authentication
ICB '09 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Advances in Biometrics
Improving the accuracy and storage cost in biometric remote authentication schemes
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
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In this paper, we clarify and verify an established biometric authentication protocol. The selected protocol is intended to have three properties: effectiveness (integrity checks are carried out on all hardware before enabling transmission of biometric data), correctness (the user is satisfied that integrity checks have been executed correctly before transmission of biometric data occurs), and secrecy (unauthorized users cannot obtain biometric data by intercepting messages between the system's hardware components). We analyse the clarified protocol using applied pi calculus and the ProVerif tool, and demonstrate that it satisfies the intended properties of the protocol.Moreover, this paper shows that the verification result between the naive interpretation and the clarified interpretation is different.