Weaknesses in a recent ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol

  • Authors:
  • Paolo D'Arco;Alfredo De Santis

  • Affiliations:
  • Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Fisciano, SA, Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Fisciano, SA, Italy

  • Venue:
  • AFRICACRYPT'08 Proceedings of the Cryptology in Africa 1st international conference on Progress in cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

In this paper we show weaknesses in SASI, a new Ultra-Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocol, designed for providing Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity. We identify three attacks, namely, a de-synchronisation attack, through which an adversary can break the synchronisation between the RFID Reader and the Tag, an identity disclosure attack, through which an adversary can compute the identity of the Tag, and a full disclosure attack, which enables an adversary to retrieve all secret data stored in the Tag. The attacks are effective and efficient.