Mutual authentication protocol for RFID conforming to EPC Class 1 Generation 2 standards
Computer Standards & Interfaces
M2AP: a minimalist mutual-authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags
UIC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing
Authenticating pervasive devices with human protocols
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Advances in Ultralightweight Cryptography for Low-Cost RFID Tags: Gossamer Protocol
Information Security Applications
A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID
Journal of Signal Processing Systems
Weaknesses in a recent ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol
AFRICACRYPT'08 Proceedings of the Cryptology in Africa 1st international conference on Progress in cryptology
Strong authentication and strong integrity (SASI) is not that strong
RFIDSec'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Radio frequency identification: security and privacy issues
Security fusion: a new security architecture for resource-constrained environments
HotSec'11 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
Quasi-linear cryptanalysis of a secure RFID ultralightweight authentication protocol
Inscrypt'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Privacy-friendly synchronized ultralightweight authentication protocols in the storm
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
RFID security in the context of "internet of things"
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security of Internet of Things
Cryptanalysis of the RNTS system
The Journal of Supercomputing
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The design of ultra-lightweight authentication protocols is imperative to the pervasive deployment of low-cost RFIDs. This paper examines the security of two well known ultra-lightweight authentication protocols (LMAP and M2AP) and the improved scheme. We demonstrate our efficient attacks on the protocols, and highlight the key weaknesses of the designs.