Wallet Databases with Observers
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Fairplay—a secure two-party computation system
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Fair secure two-party computation
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Efficiency tradeoffs for malicious two-party computation
PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography
Resource fairness and composability of cryptographic protocols
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Two-output secure computation with malicious adversaries
EUROCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 30th Annual international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques: advances in cryptology
Salus: a system for server-aided secure function evaluation
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Improved secure two-party computation via information-theoretic garbled circuits
SCN'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
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In the 1980s, Yao presented a very efficient constant-round secure two-party computation protocol withstanding semi-honest adversaries, which is based on so-called garbled circuits. Later, several protocols based on garbled circuits covering malicious adversaries have been proposed. Only a few papers, however, discuss the fundamental property of fairness for two-party computation. So far the protocol by Pinkas (Eurocrypt 2003) is the only one which deals with fairness for Yao's garbled circuit approach. In this paper, we improve upon Pinkas' protocol by presenting a more efficient variant, which includes several modifications including one that fixes a subtle security problem with the computation of the so-called majority circuit. We prove the security of our protocol according to the real/ideal simulation paradigm, as Lindell and Pinkas recently did for the malicious case (Eurocrypt 2007).