Efficiency tradeoffs for malicious two-party computation

  • Authors:
  • Payman Mohassel;Matthew Franklin

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, CA;Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, CA

  • Venue:
  • PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We study efficiency tradeoffs for secure two-party computation in presence of malicious behavior. We investigate two main approaches for defending against malicious behavior in Yao's garbled circuit method: (1) Committed-input scheme, (2) Equality-checker scheme. We provide asymptotic and concrete analysis of communication and computation costs of the designed protocols. We also develop a weaker definition of security (k-leaked model) for malicious two-party computation that allows for disclosure of some information to a malicious party. We design more efficient variations of Yao's protocol that are secure in the proposed model.