STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An Efficient Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries
EUROCRYPT '07 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Revisiting the Efficiency of Malicious Two-Party Computation
EUROCRYPT '07 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Proof of Security of Yao’s Protocol for Two-Party Computation
Journal of Cryptology
Efficient two party and multi party computation against covert adversaries
EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
Secure two-party computation via cut-and-choose oblivious transfer
TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
Two-output secure computation with malicious adversaries
EUROCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 30th Annual international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques: advances in cryptology
Efficiency tradeoffs for malicious two-party computation
PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography
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We study the optimal parameters to minimize the cheating probability and communication complexity in protocols for two party computation secure against malicious adversaries. In cut-and-choose protocols for two party computation, we analyze the optimal parameters to keep the probability of undetected cheating minimum. We first study this for a constant number of circuits, and then generalize it to the case of constant bandwidth. More generally, the communication cost of opening a circuit is different from retaining the circuit for evaluation and we analyze the optimal parameters in this case, by fixing the total bits of communication. In the second part of our analysis, we minimize the communication complexity for a given probability of undetected cheating. We study, what should be the parameters to achieve a given cheating probability in minimum amount of communication in a given cut-and-choose protocol. While still keeping the security guarantees, that is, the cheating probability negligible, we achieve a concrete improvement in communication complexity by using optimal parameters in existing cut-and-choose protocols.