Fair end-to-end window-based congestion control
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Mobile commerce: framework, applications and networking support
Mobile Networks and Applications
Stimulating cooperation in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Analysis of a static pricing scheme for priority services
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Auction-based spectrum sharing
Mobile Networks and Applications
WiFi access point pricing as a dynamic game
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
Mathematics of Operations Research
Competitions and dynamics of duopoly wireless service providers in dynamic spectrum market
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
A game-theoretic analysis of the implications of overlay network traffic on ISP peering
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Utility-optimal random access without message passing
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Service provider competition and pricing for dynamic spectrum allocation
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Utility-based power control for a two-cell CDMA data network
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Distributed interference compensation for wireless networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Revenue maximization for communication networks with usage-based pricing
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
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We study a problem where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous and atomic (non-infinitesimal) wireless users. The users differ in their utility functions as well as in the perceived quality of service of individual providers. We model the interaction of an arbitrary number of providers and users as a two-stage multi-leader-follower game, and prove existence and uniqueness of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a generic channel model and a wide class of users' utility functions. We show that, interestingly, the competition of resource providers leads to a globally optimal outcome under fairly general technical conditions. Our results show that some users need to purchase their resource from several providers at the equilibrium. While the number of such users is typically small (smaller than the number of providers), our simulations indicate that the percentage of cases where at least one undecided user exists can be significant.