Optimality Conditions for a Class of Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
Mathematics of Operations Research
Some Feasibility Issues in Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
SIAM Journal on Optimization
Fast accurate computation of large-scale IP traffic matrices from link loads
SIGMETRICS '03 Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Efficient peer location on the Internet
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Special issue on The global Internet
Selfish caching in distributed systems: a game-theoretic analysis
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Improving Traffic Locality in BitTorrent via Biased Neighbor Selection
ICDCS '06 Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
An empirical approach to modeling inter-AS traffic matrices
IMC '05 Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet Measurement
Competition of wireless providers for atomic users: equilibrium and social optimality
Allerton'09 Proceedings of the 47th annual Allerton conference on Communication, control, and computing
The implication of overlay routing on ISPs' connecting strategies
Proceedings of the 23rd International Teletraffic Congress
Quantifying video-QoE degradations of internet links
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Traffic engineering with semiautonomous users: a game-theoretic perspective
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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Inter-ISP traffic flow determines the settlement between ISPs and affects the perceived performance of ISP services. In today's Internet, the inter-ISP traffic flow patterns are controlled not only by ISPs' policy-based routing configuration and traffic engineering, but also by application layer routing. The goal of this paper is to study the economic implications of this shift in Internet traffic control assuming rational ISPs and subscribers. For this purpose, we build a general traffic model that predicts traffic patterns based on subscriber distribution and abstract traffic controls such as caching functions and performance sensitivity functions. We also build a game-theoretic model of subscribers picking ISPs, and ISPs making provisioning and peering decisions. In particular, we apply this to a local market where two ISPs compete for market share of subscribers under two traffic patterns: ''Web'' and ''P2P overlay'', that typifies the transition the current Internet is going through. Our methodology can be used to quantitatively demonstrate that (1) while economy of scale is the predominant property of the competitive ISP market, P2P traffic may introduce unfair distribution of peering benefit (i.e. free-riding); (2) the large ISP can restore more fairness by reducing its private capacity (bandwidth throttling), which has the drawback of hurting business growth; and (3) ISPs can reduce the level of peering (e.g. by reducing peering bandwidth) to restore more fairness, but this has the side-effect of also reducing the ISPs' collective bargaining power towards subscribers.