Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
A note on the confinement problem
Communications of the ACM
Digital watermarking
Similarity estimation techniques from rounding algorithms
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An Information-Theoretic Approach to Steganography and Watermarking
IH '99 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Hiding
A general framework for robust watermarking security
Signal Processing - Special section: Security of data hiding technologies
An information-theoretic model for steganography
Information and Computation
Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on Multimedia and security
Network Based Detection of Passive Covert Channels in TCP/IP
LCN '05 Proceedings of the The IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks 30th Anniversary
Watermarking Systems Engineering (Signal Processing and Communications, 21)
Watermarking Systems Engineering (Signal Processing and Communications, 21)
Information-theoretic analysis of watermarking
ICASSP '00 Proceedings of the Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 2000. on IEEE International Conference - Volume 06
Oracle attacks and covert channels
IWDW'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Digital Watermarking
A survey of watermarking security
IWDW'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Digital Watermarking
The return of the sensitivity attack
IWDW'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Digital Watermarking
Authentication theory and hypothesis testing
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Information-theoretic analysis of information hiding
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
| Hi-index | 0.01 |
The paper is structured into three main parts. In the first part, we focus on information leakage through new covert channels, we term oracle channels, which occur in case oracle attacks are performed on watermarked digital media or multimedia. In the second part, we show how to counteract oracle channels without resorting to protection tools that are quite demanding for communication networks. In the third part, we follow the information-theoretic approach to show that the countermeasures proposed in the second part do reduce the secret information leakage that flows through oracle channels, without sensibly compromising the detector reliability in case no oracle attack is performed.