Oracle attacks and covert channels

Authors:
Ilaria Venturini
Affiliations:
c/o Laboratoire des Signaux et Systèmes (LSS), École Supérieure d’Électricité (Supélec), École Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications ( ...
Venue:
IWDW'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Digital Watermarking
Year:
2005

Citing 6
Cited 2

Elements of information theory

Elements of information theory
Digital watermarking

Digital watermarking
Similarity estimation techniques from rounding algorithms

STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Counteracting Oracle attacks

Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on Multimedia and security
Information-theoretic analysis of watermarking

ICASSP '00 Proceedings of the Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 2000. on IEEE International Conference - Volume 06
Information-theoretic analysis of information hiding

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

Oracle channels

Transactions on data hiding and multimedia security III
Watermarking security: a survey

Transactions on Data Hiding and Multimedia Security I

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In this paper, well-known attacks named oracle attacks are formulated within a realistic network communication model where they reveal to use suitable covert channels, we name oracle channels. By exploiting information-theoretic notions, we show how to modify detection/authentication watermarking algorithms in order to counteract oracle attacks. We present three proposals, one based on randomization, another one based on time delay and a third one based on both randomization and delay.