Combinatorial Information Market Design
Information Systems Frontiers
A Multi-agent Prediction Market Based on Boolean Network Evolution
WI-IAT '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
What you jointly know determines how you act: strategic interactions in prediction markets
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We conduct laboratory experiments on variants of market scoring rules prediction markets, under different information distribution patterns, in order to evaluate the efficiency and speed of information aggregation, as well as test recent theoretical results on manipulative behavior by traders. We find that markets structured to have a fixed sequence of trades exhibit greater accuracy of information aggregation than the typical form that has unstructured trades. Prior theoretical predictions of differing strategic behavior under complementary information distributions and substitute information distributions are confirmed when the trading order is structured, but not in markets with an unstructured trading order. In the case of the market with a structured order, we find that the information aggregation is consequently slower when information is complementary, as traders more frequently engage in bluffing and delaying strategies. In comparing two commonly used mechanisms, we find no significant difference between the performance of the direct probability-report form and the indirect security-trading form of the market scoring rule.