Multi-object auctions: sequential vs. simultaneous sales
Management Science
Optimal price skimming by a monopolist facing rational consumers
Management Science
Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Revenue Management
Management Science
Designing online selling mechanisms: Transparency levels and prices
Decision Support Systems
Multi-stage sequential uniform price auction mechanism for divisible goods
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
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Under what circumstances will a seller be better off selling the inventory sequentially, rather than selling it all in a single auction? Does it benefit the seller to reveal how many auctions there will be? We study a uniform-price auction, in which bidders demand no more than one item, and have independent, private values. We show that even (1) when all buyers are present at the beginning of the auction, and (2) when both the seller and the buyers are impatient, a sequential sale can still benefit the seller as it stimulates competition among forward-looking bidders. This result depends on: (1) the bidder competition intensity, which is characterized by the difference between the number of items available and the number of buyers; and (2) the impatience levels of the auctioneer and the bidders. We also show that when there is uncertainty about the quantity supplied, a high-inventory auctioneer may benefit from using sequential auctions by pretending to be a low-inventory one initially.