On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium for a Two-player Pursuit-Evasion Game with Visibility Constraints

  • Authors:
  • Sourabh Bhattacharya;Seth Hutchinson

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Universityof Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Universityof Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA

  • Venue:
  • International Journal of Robotics Research
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a game-theoretic analysis of a visibility-based pursuit-evasion game in a planar environment containing obstacles. The pursuer and the evader are holonomic having bounded speeds. Both players have a complete map of the environment. Both players have omnidirectional vision and have knowledge about each other's current position as long as they are visible to each other. The pursuer wants to maintain visibility of the evader for the maximum possible time and the evader wants to escape the pursuer's sight as soon as possible. Under this information structure, we present necessary and sufficient conditions for surveillance and escape. We present strategies for the players that are in Nash equilibrium. The strategies are a function of the value of the game. Using these strategies, we construct a value function by integrating the adjoint equations backward in time from the termination situations provided by the corners in the environment. From these value functions we recompute the control strategies for the players to obtain optimal trajectories for the players near the termination situation. This is the first work that presents the necessary and sufficient conditions for tracking for a visibility based pursuit-evasion game and presents the equilibrium strategies for the players.