The State of Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Designs, Codes and Cryptography - Special issue on towards a quarter-century of public key cryptography
Password authentication with insecure communication
Communications of the ACM
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
GKMPAN: An Efficient Group Rekeying Scheme for Secure Multicast in Ad-Hoc Networks
Journal of Computer Security
Securing vehicular ad hoc networks
Journal of Computer Security - Special Issue on Security of Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks
Certificate revocation list distribution in vehicular communication systems
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international workshop on VehiculAr Inter-NETworking
Security certificate revocation list distribution for vanet
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international workshop on VehiculAr Inter-NETworking
Eviction of Misbehaving and Faulty Nodes in Vehicular Networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Complementing public key infrastructure to secure vehicular ad hoc networks
IEEE Wireless Communications
Security in vehicular adhoc networks: a survey
Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on Communication, Computing & Security
Efficient HMAC-based secure communication for VANETs
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
MLAS: Multiple level authentication scheme for VANETs
Ad Hoc Networks
BECSI: Bandwidth efficient certificate status information distribution mechanism for VANETs
Mobile Information Systems
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Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) adopt the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) to reliably secure the network. In any PKI system, the authentication of a received message is performed by checking that the certificate of the sender is not included in the current CRL, and verifying the authenticity of the certificate and signature of the sender. In this paper, we propose a Message Authentication Acceleration (MAAC) protocol for VANETs, which replaces the time-consuming CRL checking process by an efficient revocation check process. The revocation check process uses a keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), where the key used in calculating the HMAC is shared only between non-revoked On-Board Units (OBUs). In addition, the MAAC protocol uses a novel probabilistic key distribution, which enables non-revoked OBUs to securely share and update a secret key. By conducting security analysis and performance evaluation, the MAAC protocol is demonstrated to be secure and efficient.