Bargaining to improve channel sharing between selfish cognitive radios

  • Authors:
  • Hua Liu;Allen B. MacKenzie;Bhaskar Krishnamachari

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA;Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA;University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA

  • Venue:
  • GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We consider a problem where two selfish cognitive radio users try to share two channels on which they each have potentially different valuations. We first formulate the problem as a non-cooperative simultaneous game, and identify its equilibria. For cases where the resulting Nash equilibria are not efficient, we then propose a novel coordinated channel access mechanism that can be implemented with low overhead in a decentralized fashion. This mechanism, based on the Nash bargaining solution, guarantees full utilization of the spectrum resources while improving the utility of each user compared to the non-cooperative setting. We quantify the resulting gains. Finally, we prove that risk-averse users that are willing to accept offered information at face value have no incentive to lie to each other about their valuations for the non-cooperative game. However, we find that truthfulness is not guaranteed in the bargaining process, suggesting as an open problem the design of an incentive compatible mechanism for bargaining.