Sentry: light-weight auxiliary memory access control

  • Authors:

  • Arrvindh Shriraman;Sandhya Dwarkadas

  • Affiliations:

  • University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA;University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 37th annual international symposium on Computer architecture
  • Year:
  • 2010

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Light-weight, flexible access control, which allows software to regulate reads and writes to any granularity of memory region, can help improve the reliability of today's multi-module multi-programmer applications, as well as the efficiency of software debugging tools. Unfortunately, access control in today's processors is tied to support for virtual memory, making its use both heavy weight and coarse grain. In this paper, we propose Sentry, an auxiliary level of virtual memory tagging that is entirely subordinate to existing virtual memory-based protection mechanisms and can be manipulated at the user level. We implement these tags in a complexity-effective manner using an M-cache (metadata cache) structure that only intervenes on L1 misses, thereby minimizing changes to the processor core. Existing cache coherence states are repurposed to implicitly validate permissions for L1 hits. Sentry achieves its goal of flexible and light-weight access control without disrupting existing inter-application protection, sidestepping the challenges associated with adding a new protection framework to an existing operating system. We illustrate the benefits of our design point using 1) an Apache-based web server that uses the M-cache to enforce protection boundaries among its modules and 2) a watchpoint-based tool to demonstrate low-overhead debugging. Protection is achieved with very few changes to the source code, no changes to the programming model, minimal modifications to the operating system, and with low overhead incurred only when accessing memory regions for which the additional level of access control is enabled.