Separating succinct non-interactive arguments from all falsifiable assumptions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Limits of provable security from standard assumptions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Publicly verifiable proofs of sequential work
Proceedings of the 4th conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
On the power of nonuniformity in proofs of security
Proceedings of the 4th conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
Unprovable security of perfect NIZK and non-interactive non-malleable commitments
TCC'13 Proceedings of the 10th theory of cryptography conference on Theory of Cryptography
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Starting with Kilian (STOC ‘92), several works have shown how to use probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) and cryptographic primitives such as collision-resistant hashing to construct very efficient argument systems (a.k.a. computationally sound proofs), for example with polylogarithmic communication complexity. Ishai et al. (CCC ‘07) raised the question of whether PCPs are inherent in efficient arguments, and if so, to what extent. We give evidence that they are, by showing how to convert any argument system whose soundness is reducible to the security of some cryptographic primitive into a PCP system whose efficiency is related to that of the argument system and the reduction (under certain complexity assumptions).