Limits of provable security from standard assumptions

  • Authors:
  • Rafael Pass

  • Affiliations:
  • Cornell, Ithaca, NY, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

We show that the security of some well-known cryptographic protocols, primitives and assumptions (e.g., the Schnorr identification scheme, commitments secure under adaptive selective-decommitment, the 'one-more' discrete logarithm assumption) cannot be based on any standard assumption using a Turing (i.e., black-box) reduction. These results follow from a general result showing that Turing reductions cannot be used to prove security of constant-round sequentially witness-hiding special-sound protocols for unique witness relations, based on standard assumptions; we emphasize that this result holds even if the protocol makes non-black-box use of the underlying assumption.