Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
An attack-finding algorithm for security protocols
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Security Protocol Design via Authentication Tests
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Study on strand space model theory
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
Extending the Strand Space Method to Verify Kerberos V
PDCAT '07 Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing, Applications and Technologies
Security protocol analysis with improved authentication tests
ISPEC'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
Hi-index | 0.01 |
The theory of authentication tests is a powerful tool for analyzing and designing cryptographic protocols. However, it is difficult to apply the theory directly to prove the security goals of the protocols because determining the type of the test (e.g. outgoing, incoming and unsolicited test) is a little complex for computer and deriving the security properties of a test needs more intelligence. Therefore, automatic security protocol analyzer cannot be implemented efficiently based on this theory. To solve this problem, in this paper we propose an authentication test type matrix (ATTM), which makes the identification of the test type very simple and straightforward. Furthermore, we propose and prove a set of security properties associated with each case indicated by the elements in the ATTM, which can be used directly in protocol analysis and design. Using the example of Needham-Schroeder protocol, we demonstrate that ATTM makes automatic security protocol verification and design much easier and more straightforward.